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Investment Contracts Under Federal
and State Law
IN OHIO, a security is defined as "any certificate or instrument
which represents title to or interest in, or is secured by any lien
or charge upon, the capital, assets, profits, property, or credit of any
person."' It includes, inter alia, shares of stocks, all forms of com-
mercial paper, evidences of indebtedness, any instrument evidencing
a promise or an agreement to pay money, and any investment con-
tract.2 As with all state securities acts, the Ohio Securities Act is to
be liberally construed in order to achieve the purposes of its enact-
ment: regulation of the issuance and sale of securities and prevention
of the perpetration of fraud.3 The term "security" is defined in very
general terms in the Ohio Act. In drafting the definition section,
the committee emphasized that it believed this section to include
virtually every form of security familiar to the financial world.4
The committee also believed that a very general definition would
render determinations of the status of new instruments far less
onerous.
5
While the definition of security is broad and far-reaching, a
number of problems have arisen in construing it. This Note will
examine several unique situations which have arisen concerning
"investment contracts." First, however, it is essential to consider
the leading cases and tests which have developed under the federal
securities acts6 in determining whether a particular instrument or
agreement is an investment contract and therefore a security. Sec-
ond, it will then be possible to examine certain Ohio and other
state cases which have presented unique problems under the invest-
ment contract concept.
SOHIo REV. CODE § 1707.01 (B).
2 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
348 OHIO JUR. 2D Securities Regulation § 2 (1966); Sellers v. State, 18 Ohio L.
Abs. 328 (Ct. App. 1934).
4 Report of the Ohio Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law and Committee
on Blue Sky Law, I OHIo BAR No. 42, 1, 7-8 (Jan. 15, 1929), cited in Boesel, Analysis
of the Ohio Securities Act, 5 W. REs. L. REv. 352, 354 (1954).
5 Ibid.
6 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
1108
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
I. THE FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Leading Cases
The Securities Act of 1933,' like the Ohio Act, defines the
term "security" to include investment contracts. Certain definite
tests have arisen under the Federal Act in construing "investment
contracts." It is important to examine the cases developing these
tests.
In SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp.,8 the United States Supreme
Court issued its first important opinion concerning investment con-
tracts.' There, the court found that certain assignments of oil and
gas leasehold interests in tracts of real estate leased to the defendant
Joiner, together with an agreement by the defendant to drill test
wells on the land retained by it, constituted "securities."
The defendant had emphasized the character of the purchase
as an investment and as participation in an enterprise in its adver-
tising materials.1" Thus, defendant stated that the proposition was
being made only to business people "who are interested in making
an investment where they have a good chance for splendid returns
on the investment."" The court found that the defendant was not
offering naked leasehold rights.'" If the corporation's offer had
not included the inducement of the promised exploration well, the
situation would have been entirely different. 3 In that case, the
purchasers would have had to exploit their interests themselves
and to determine the productivity or non-productivity of their land.
This would have involved time and expense to the purchasers. On
the contrary, however, defendant corporation was offering the pur-
chasers an opportunity to share in any results of exploration by de-
fendant, with little time or expense. The drilling of the well by
defendant was inherently interwoven into the leaseholds and "runs
through the entire transaction as the thread on which everybody's
beads were strung."' 4  Indeed, acceptance of the offer by the pur-
7 Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1964).
8320 U'S. 344 (1943).
9 Pasquesi, The Expanding "Securities" Concept, 49 ILL. Bj. 728, 729 (1961).
10 320 U.S. 344, 346 (1943).
Id. at 346-47 n.3.
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chaser resulted in a contract in which payments depended upon com-
pletion of the well. Therefore, this was an investment contract in
which both a lease and a development project were involved. 5
The Court emphasized that it is not the nature of the assets be-
hind a particular instrument which is the test of whether it is a
security. Rather, it is "what character the instrument is given in
commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and
the economic inducements held out to the prospect.""  Further, in
this type of case, since the promoter holds out his offerings as being
of a certain nature, they will be judged as if actually of that nature.
Thus, assignments of oil leases are "investment contracts" or "secu-
rities" within the purview of the Securities Act of 1933, and sellers
of these interests must conform to the requirements of the Act.
The majority of state courts have adhered to as liberal an interpreta-
tion of state securities acts.
17
In the Joiner case, the Supreme Court significantly committed
itself to a liberal construction of the definition of security. In do-
ing so, it rejected defendant's "expressio unius est exclusio alterius"
argument that sales of leasehold subdivisions by acre do not consti-
tute securities, since the Securities Act expressly includes sales of
leasehold subdivisions by undivided shares. 8 The Court stated that
such rules and canons of construction aid in ascertaining legislative
intent, but are subordinate to the precept that the courts will in-
terpret an act so as to effectuate its dominant purpose and the legis-
lative policy behind it.
In SEC v. Howey Co., 9 an offering of units of a citrus grove
development coupled with a contract for cultivation of the property
and for remitting the net proceeds to the investor were held to con-
stitute an investment contract within the meaning of the Securties
Act of 1933. In that case every prospective customer was in-
formed that it was not possible to invest in a grove unless the ser-
vice arrangements were included in the agreement and therefore
was offered both a land sales contract and a service contract. The
superiority of the defendant's service company was stressed, although
the purchaser was not precluded from entering into agreements
with other similar companies. The service contract gave the de-
15 Id. at 349.
161d. at 352-53. (Emphasis added.)
17 See, e.g., Prohaska v. Hemmer-Miller Dev. Co., 256 Ill. App. 331 (1930); Wag-
ner v. Kelso, 195 Iowa 959, 193 N.W. 1 (1923).
18 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943).
19 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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fendant service company a leasehold interest plus exclusive posses-
sion of the land, generally for a ten year period without option of
cancellation ° Under the service contract, the service company
assumed full control of the cultivation of the groves and crops. The
purchasers were largely non-residents of Florida and business
people who lacked the expertise requisite to the adequate care and
cultivation of citrus groves. They were attracted by the expecta-
tion of generous profits which, it was asserted, would amount to a
ten per cent annual return over a ten-year period, and even to twenty
per cent for one season.2
The Court initially pointed out that the definition of security
contained within the 1933 Act encompasses the "commonly known
documents traded for speculation or investment."'  However, it
also encompasses instruments of a "more variable character,"' such
as investment contracts. In the Howey case, the Court viewed the
legal issue as a determination of whether the land sales contract,
the warranty deed, and the service contract together constituted an
investment contract under these particular circumstances 4
In order to consider this issue effectively, the Court next exam-
ined the investment contract concept itself. Concluding that it
was undefined by the 1933 Act or appropriate legislative material,
the Court pointed out that the term was nevertheless utilized with
some frequency in state blue sky laws prior to the adoption of the
Federal Act. Although the term is also undefined in state blue
sky laws, judicial interpretation by the states has resulted in con-
struction of the statutes so as to protect the public as fully as pos-
sible 5 Significantly, the Court emphasized that on the state level,
"form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon
economic reality."26  Further, under state court decisions, a defini-
tion of investment contract became crystallized?' The Howey court
then reasoned that the meaning attributed to the term "investment
contract" by the states should be presumed to be identical with the
meaning intended by Congress in the 1933 Act, especially since this
20 Id. at 296.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 297.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Id. at 298.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. See State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Mfinn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937,
938 (1920), cited in the Howey opinion at 298.
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definition would be consistent with statutory goals. It was con-
cluded that for purposes of the 1933 Act, an investment contract
means "°a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoters or a third party, it being
immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by
formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets em-
ployed in the enterprise."2
This definition, the Court stated, was necessarily implied in the
Joiner decision, and had previously been utilized by the federal
courts.' It permits attainment of the statutory purpose of full and
fair disclosure of any instrument which might be a security.
The proceedings involved in the Howey case dearly fell within
the Court's definition of investment contract, since the respondent
corporations were actually offering to the purchasers an oppor-
tunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a business
at least partially owned and operated by the respondents. 0 In
order to achieve this purpose, a "common enterprise" managed by
respondents or third parties was essential and was represented by
the land sale contracts and warranty. The profit-seeking business
there involved investment contracts in the form of land sales con-
tracts, warranty deeds, and service contracts.3
Finally, the Howey court emphasized that a proposition need
not be "speculative or promotional in character" in order to be
found to constitute an investment contract.3 Nor need the interest
sold have intrinsic value apart from the success of the business as
a whole. The test "whether the scheme involves an investment
of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others. '  If this test is satisfied, the aforementioned
factors are irrelevant.34
Prior to evaluating the Joiner and Howey decisions, it would
28328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
29 Id. at 299 & n.5. See discussion of federal cases in text accompanying notes 45-
54 infra.
30 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
31 Id. at 300.
32 Id. at 301.
33 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
3 4 Justice Frankfurter dissented, urging that the essential issue in the case involved
whether the contracts for the land and those involving management of the property
constituted separate transactions or were inextricably interwoven. He asserted emphat-
ically that the Supreme Court should not upset the "concurrent findings of two lower
courts in the ascertainment of facts .... Id. at 301-02.
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be helpful to examine a recent federal decision in this area. In
Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC,3  one of the is-
sues involved was whether the appellants were selling securities un-
der the 1933 Act. The SEC contended that the sale through a
"Secured 10% Earnings Program" constituted more than a simple
sale of second trust deeds or a mere interest in property. On the
contrary, it contended that the transaction involved here constituted
an investment contract, specifically within the purview of the 1933
Act.
LATD had purchased second trust deed notes at discounts of
more than forty per cent and an implied guarantee of ten per cent
return to the purchasers, with LATD receiving an average profit of
twenty-five per cent. It claimed that the choice of trust deeds was
solely within the control of the purchaser and that each purchaser
had the right of rejection within five days and that the services of-
fered were to accommodate the purchasers only and were not an
integral part of the trust deeds. Thus, appellants reasoned that they
did not fall within the ambit of the Joiner and Howey cases.
The court pointed to the Joiner and Howey cases as guides in
determining whether a particular instrument or transaction involves
an investment contract. After discussing the relevant facts and
holdings of each case, it concluded that "Howey adds the test of
common enterprise to the Joiner test of results dependent on the
efforts of one other than the purchaser."8
The court addressed itself to the question of whether the in-
vestor is led to "expect profits solely from the efforts of one or
more defendants arising from a common enterprise."3  In order
to answer that question, the court looked to the number of factors
which, together, it considered to be determinative. First, it pointed
out that at least persons untrained in finance would probably con-
clude that appellants were offering more than a mere note secured
by a second mortgage or a deed of trust on property. Further, many
purchasers never saw the trust deed or the real property, as there was
no physical delivery in most cases. Also, purchasers were urged to
rely on appellant's knowledge and expertise and there was an
"anticipated common effort."38  The brochures published by appel-
lants reinforced this impression. The court also stressed the occa-
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sions when trust deeds were sold to investors' accounts and then re-
purchased by appellants, so that appellants could profit from the
proposed accelerated payment of principal, which was not known
to the purchaser. Nor was the purchaser given the profit on the
payment before maturity, even though the appellants admitted this
was done by mistake.3" The court also considered representations
made by appellants to prospective purchasers, as well as a memor-
andum which was "illuminating" as to their interest payments.4"
Having considered the aforementioned factors, the court con-
cluded that the second trust deed notes involved in the case were
investment contracts and therefore securities. It found a "common
enterprise," in which both the appellants and the purchasers had an
economic interest. Inextricably entwined with the economic suc-
cess of the enterprise was LATD's ability to locate independently a
quantity of discounted trust deeds and to perform its other obliga-
tions. Investors were given reason to rely on representations of the
per cent earnings solely on the basis of LATD's acquiring the requi-
site trust deeds, collecting the loan and taking care of any necessary
dealings concerning the loan, and if necessary repurchasing or ar-
ranging for repurchase. The court relied on the lower court's find-
ing that there was "an implied guarantee against loss" here.41
Thus, "the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, the
economic inducements held out to the prospects, the results de-
pendent on one other than the purchaser and the common enter-
prise," considered together, rendered the second trust deed notes
investment contracts and "securities" within the meaning of the
Supreme Court's definition of those terms.
Upon careful examination of the Joiner, Howey, and LATD
decisions, it becomes apparent that in each of these cases the in-
vestors were offered interests in real estate or interests secured by
real estate. Each court pointed out that none of the interests, alone,
could have constituted an investment contract and a security. How-
ever, coupled with the property interest in each case was a manage-
ment or service arrangement, under which the seller or some other
party was given the power essential to management of the business
and to attainment of the promised return or profit.
In Joiner, the additional and fatal agreement was that relating to
391d. at 169-70.
40Id. at 171.




the drilling of the oil well; in Howey, the service contract involving
management of the land was considered an essential part of the
transaction; in LATD, the expertise and knowledge of appellants
was considered an integral part of the second trust deed notes trans-
actions and sales. In LATD, as contrasted with Joiner and Howey,
the "fatal" aspect of the transaction necessarily occurred before the
notes were acquired, rather than afterward. However, additional
factors were present in the LATD case. Thus, the consideration of
the repurchasing, reinvesting, and servicing with appellants' selec-
tion of the trust deed notes resulted in reliance by the investors on
the expertise of LATD, rather than on the intrinsic value of the
notes.43 All these factors, considered together, resulted in deter-
mination of the transactions as investment contracts.
Thus, it becomes apparent that in attempting to ascertain
whether an investment contract is involved in a particular situation,
the courts will carefully scrutinize all aspects of the relationship be-
tween the parties involved, with a particular eye to any services
which may be offered to the investor. The Howey formula has
been interpreted to apply to a great variety of transactions and
schemes, both under state and federal statutes.44 In fact, it has
been asserted that the term "investment contract" has been adapted,
by judicial interpretation, to include any anomalous instrument or
situation which does not fall clearly within any other definitional
category.45
In a release, the SEC pointed out that where mortgages or trust
deeds are involved, the chief criteria it will examine in determining
whether an investment contract is involved are the following: in-
vestment selection, payment collection, installment terms, minimum
rate of return guarantee, and reliance upon the vendor, as indicated
by investment among other things."
B. Other Federal Cases
In devising its definition of investment contract, the United
States Supreme Court, in the Howey case, cited a number of federal
and state decisions which had followed the same definition prior
4 8 See Pasquesi, supra note 9.
44 1 Loss, SECURiTIES REGULATION 469-511 (1961).
45 See Pasquesi, supra note 9.
46 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3892 (Jan. 1958), Litigation Release No. 1876
(Jan. 1961). See Pasquesi, supra note 9, at 732.
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to Howey.4" Without discussing all these cases in detail, it is help-
ful to mention one or two key decisions.
In Atherton v. United States,4" the defendants conceded their
involvement in a scheme to defraud others through the sale of par-
tial assignments of oil and gas leases and undivided interests in a
drill site. The government alleged that the sale of assignments of
these oil and gases leases constituted the sale of a security as de-
fined under the 1933 Act. The defendants denied that the leases
constituted securities. The court pointed out that the purchasers
were entirely dependent upon the efforts of the promoters to make
their investments profitable. The land leased to each purchaser
was not itself susceptible to economic development, nor did the
purchasers intend to exploit the land independently. The leases
were sold, as in the Joiner case, on the representation that a drill
would be put into operation in order to prove the productivity of
the entire area under lease. Further, once the well was completed,
the entire area would be sold in one unit, and each purchaser of an
assignment would receive a proportionate share of the purchase
price. The court held that it was clear that an investment contract
was involved here, stressing that the federal courts had uniformly
held that when the investor looks to the promoter to determine the
success of the investment, an investment contract and a security are
involved.4"
In Penfield Co. v. SEC, ° the court adopted the Atherton con-
cept of investment contract as encompassing agreements where
there is complete reliance by the purchasers on the promoters to
make their investment profitable.5' In Penfield, bottling contracts
received in exchange for whiskey warehouse receipts which con-
tained agreements that whiskey represented by the receipts would
be bottled and sold without any separate holding of the whiskey
for the contracting parties and would be sold by them were con-
sidered to be investment contracts.
Thus, the federal cases prior to Howey had developed the defini-
tion of investment contract espoused by the Supreme Court. Recent
federal cases follow the same pattern, naturally adhering to the
4 7 See State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937-38
(1920), and cases cited in SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1946).
48 128 F.2d 463 (9th Cit. 1942).
49 Ibid.
50 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944).
51 Id. at 750.
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Howey test. In United States v. Herr,52 an Illinois corporation
claimed to be selling distributor agreements, but gave every indica-
tion that those purchasing distributor agreements would remain in-
active and could rely on the corporation to obtain profit. Relying
on the Howey case, the court pointed out that there was a business
for profit here, with actual management and control by the pro-
moters, constituting an investment contract. Regardless of the
statement in the agreement that the relation created was that of
vendor and purchaser, it was not the intention of either party that
the investors were to resell the merchandise involved. The investors
were described as inactive and were given reason to believe that they
could expect profit solely from the effort of others.53
It is appropriate to mention here that the Uniform Securities
Act"4 includes "investment contracts" in its definition of securities.
The official comment to the definition section of the Act55 states
that this section is nearly identical to the definition section of the
Securities Act of 1933. The drafters point out that the definition,
and the concept of "investment contract" in particular, have been
broadly construed by both state and federal courts."6
II. STATE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Ohio
The first Ohio blue sky law was enacted in 1913."7 It was
replaced by the current law in 1929."8 Ohio was one of the earliest
states to enact a blue sky law, the legislative intent behind the act
being to prevent fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of securi-
ties.5" Basically, there are four types of securities acts."0  Ohio's
52 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964).
53Ibid. See SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 93 F.2d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 1937); SEC v.
Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941) both cited in Howey. See also Lenneth v.
Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
5 4 LOSS & CowETT, BLUE SKY LAW 332-52 (1958).
5 5 Uniform Securities Act § 401 (1), in Loss & Cow= r, op. cit. supra note 54, at
350.
56 Ibid.
5 7 Nida, The Ohio Division of Securities and the Ohio Securities Act, 13 OIO ST.
Lj. 427, 428 (1952).
5 8 0mo SEcttrrIEs Acr OF 1929, 113 Ohio Laws 216 (1929). See Nida, supra
note 57, at 431-32.
59Ibid. Thus, in Groby v. State, 109 Ohio St. 543, 143 N.E. 126 (1924), the court
stated, concerning the Ohio Securities Act, that:
This legislation was enacted for the obvious purpose of guarding investors
against fraudulent enterprises, to prevent sales of securities based only on
schemes purely speculative in character and to protect the public from swin-
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is essentially a "licensing and inspection" type, which regulates
both securities and dealers. While this is the most prevalent type
of blue sky law, the Ohio Act may be broader in scope than many
acts of its general type.6
While the Ohio definition of a security is probably as liberal and
all-inclusive as any other,"2 several leading Ohio cases have failed to
find investment contracts and securities when applying the Howey
test. Thus, in two 1956 criminal cases, an Ohio Court of Appeals
and the Ohio Supreme Court held that a bona fide sale of a coopera-
tive apartment to be occupied by the buyer did not involve a secu-
rity. Both courts found this to be the case, despite the fact that a
corporation was to be organized in each case to issue shares pro
rata as evidence of ownerships of units of the apartment.'
In State v. Silberberg, the court examined the contracts in-
volved in order to determine whether securities were involved. The
supreme court pointed out that courts have had some difficulty in
determining what constitutes a security. Therefore, they have pre-
ferred not to utilize an all-inclusive definition and have chosen to
"draw the lines of demarcation as the circumstances of each case
present themselves." 5 However, in determining whether an interest
is an investment contract or an interest in real estate, it is the
individual control which the purchaser has over the property or
venture in which he has acquired an interest that should be exam-
ined. Generally, if the purchaser is to partake of the gross proceeds
or net profits of enterprises managed by those disposing of the in-
terest, the instrument involved is held to be an investment con-
tract."6 On the other hand, if the purchaser of real property is to
occupy the premises and conduct the enterprise with others, the in-
strument involved is generally not an investment contract or a
security. In Silberberg, each contract contained a provision to the
effect that when the corporation was organized, the purchaser would
dling peddlers of worthless stocks in mere paper corporations. It should be so
administered as to fully meet the purpose of its enactment. Id. at 550, 143
N.E. at 128.
60 Boesel, Analysis of the Ohio Securities Act, 5 W. REs. L. REv. 352 (1954).
61 Id. at 354.
62 See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
63 State v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956); State v. Hirsch,
101 Ohio App. 425, 131 N.E.2d 419 (1956). See 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 44, at
492.
64 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).




transfer his interest in the property to the corporation and receive
stock in it proportionate to the interest purchased. But this part
of the contract was essential to the operation and management of
the building as a whole, and thus the transaction did not fall within
the purview of the Ohio Securities Act.67 The intent of the contract
here was dearly to provide the buyers with an interest in an apart-
ment building for the purpose of occupying it as a home. Further,
neither the evidence of the parties involved nor the contract itself
revealed any plan to invest in a profit-sharing venturd. The pur-
chasers did what they alleged they would do; they took possession
of and occupied the property described in the contracts.
In Silberberg the court stressed another aspect of an investment
contract and a security. It stated that the purpose of investing in a
security is in the hope of receiving income as a return on such in-
vestment. There was no indication of this in the instant case. The
provisions in the contract in regard to the formation of a corpora-
tion were subsidiary and tangential to the acquisition of an interest
in the apartment building. Since the purchasers here were actually
buying real estate and not shares in a corporation, the transactions
involved could not constitute investment contracts or securities.6"
In State v. Hirsch," once again, the land contract involved
acquisition of an undivided interest in an apartment building with
the right to occupy it as a home. The vendor was required to
deliver a warranty deed upon complete performance of the contract.
The court held that the contract involved constituted the purchase
of an interest in land and not in a security, despite the fact that
shares of stock would be issued upon payment of the purchase price.
Again, the purchasers were, according to the findings of the court,
purchasing a dwelling rather than looking for an investment. And
the securities were not being sold by the vendors for investment
purposes. Since the land contracts here amounted to genuine pur-
chases of interests in land, they did not fall within the ambit of the
Ohio Securities Act. The court relied on the Silberberg decision."0
Thus, in both Silberberg and Hirsch, the courts held that forma-
tion of a corporation was only incidental to operation of the build-
ing as a cooperative enterprise. Also, in neither case did the con-
tracts require that the buyer subscribe to the stock or exchange his
6 7 OlIo REV. CODE 5 1707.01 (B).
68 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.X.2d 342 (1956).
69 101 Ohio App. 425, 131 NX.2d 419 (1956).
7OId. at 434, 131 N.E.2d at 424-25.
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deed for corporate shares7 According to Loss, it would have been
more direct to state that substance governs rather than form, or
in other words, that certain transactions which superficially appear
to be real estate are actually securities, and certain transactions
which appear to be securities are actually real estate. 2  Neverthe-
less, the result in both cases appears to be reasonable and completely
in line with the Howey test.
Other types of contracts also have been considered. In the last
three years, a novel question has twice been raised in the Ohio
courts: what is a customer referral agreement and is it a security?
In Yoder v. So-Soft of Ohio,7 a contract between the parties
involved the sale of an over-priced water softener, sold to plaintiffs.
The primary motivation for the purchase was the profit to be de-
rived from the provision in the contract allowing a payment to the
purchaser-customer of 100 dollars for each purchaser referred to
defendant who consummated a similar agreement with it. The
Court of Common Pleas of Stark County held that the contract was
null and void, as it constituted the sale of a security within the
meaning of the Ohio Act for which defendant was not licensed.
According to the court, So-Soft utilized the sale of a water softener
as a "mere subterfuge" to induce plaintiffs to enter into the agree-
ment, with the real motivation being the sale of an instrument
representing the promise to pay money."
A later court of appeals case apparently overrules Yoder. In
Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio,75 plaintiffs sought to set aside a contract
containing a "customer referral agreement." Once again, the terms
of the contract provided that plaintiffs were to purchase a water
softener from defendant So-Soft, which was to install it. So-Soft
promised a guaranteed amount of money to the purchasers if they
furnished the defendant with the names of persons who would
consummate agreements for the purchase of the product as well
as another sum of money for a list of twenty "qualified prospects."
The court examined the key terms of the referral agreement. First,
it looked at the term of the contract concerning the sale and terms
of sale and installment of the water softener; next, the terms of
payment for the referral aspect of the agreement itself; third, the
71 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 44, at 492.
72 Ibid.
73 202 NE.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
74 Id. at 331.
75 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio App. 1964).
1120
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
fact that the contract specifically stated that the plaintiff would be
acting as an independent contractor and would have to pay all rele-
vant taxes. Plaintiffs contended that the referral agreement con-
stituted a security and that, therefore, they had the right to rescind
the sale upon tender of the security and to seek redress against the
seller and anyone aiding him.
The Emery court-traced the definition of a security and of an
investment contract from the Ohio Revised Code definition to the
Silberberg case, and including the Howey test.76 It adopted the
Silberberg test, looking to the individual control which the pur-
chaser has over the property or transaction in which he acquired
the interest. Perhaps of greater interest are the two other cases
relied on by the court. First, it pointed to the case of People v.
Syde,77 a California case, in which the defendant corporation, a
producer and seller of dramatic exhibitions for the different media,
entered into service contracts with "artists" to provide for their
training in dramatics. The consideration was a stated fee plus ser-
vices of the artist for participation in dramatic exhibitions, plus a
share in potential profits to be realized therefrom. The California
Code definition of security included "investment contract." Accord-
ing to the Syde court, whether an instrument is a security must de-
pend on the circumstances of each case. However, the court
stressed the distinction between an interest in a profit-sharing agree-
ment or in profits and earnings and an agreement of active partici-
pation in an enterprise, even with the expectation of some material
return. The California law was not intended to supervise or regu-
late instruments which essentially involve agreements with persons
expecting a return from their own services or their own participa-
tion in an enterprise, and such an instrument does not constitute
an investment contract or a security. Such an instrument is dearly
distinguishable from one in which a party, for consideration, pur-
chases a right to share in the profits or proceeds of a business which
is to be conducted by others.7"
The second case examined by the Emery court was that of Penn-
sylvania SEC v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc.,79 in which
agreements for the sale of vacuum cleaners, according to which the
purchaser would be paid a commission for each new purchaser re-
761d. at 123.
77235 P.2d 601 (CaL App. 1951).
78 Id. at 603.
7 9 CCH BLUB SKY L. REP. 70640 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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ferred to the seller, were held not to constitute securities. The court
reasoned that the advertising agent was not promised a share of de-
fendant's profits and was only to be paid a specific fee for his own
"individual promotional efforts.""0
From these two cases, the Emery court deduced that:
[T]o establish [that] an instrument or certificate is a security, it
must be shown that such instrument or certificate represents an
investment in a designated portion of the assets and capital of a
concern with the hope of receiving a profit solely through the
efforts of persons other than the investor.81
Conversely the court stated that the mere representation by an
instrument of a purchaser's right to reap a profit from his own ser-
vices, where profit is guaranteed upon performance of such ser-
vices and no interest in the capital or assets of the seller is evidenced,
does not constitute a security.82
Applying these concepts of investment contracts and securities,
the Emery court reasoned that the referral agreement in the instant
case could hardly be said to constitute an instrument "representing
tide to or interest in the capital, assets, profits, property or credit
of So-Soft."83  While the contract promised to pay money, so do
many salesmen's commission and employment contracts. There
was to be no acquisition of an interest in the profits or capital, assets,
or property of So-Soft stemming from the referral agreement. In
fact, here there was "merely an offer for a unilateral contract" by
defendant So-Soft, agreeing to pay plaintiffs a sum of money if
plaintiffs performed certain acts. A security would involve com-
plete reliance for anticipated profit by the purchaser on the efforts
of the promoter; the referral agreement here depended solely for
its effect on the efforts of the purchaser alone.84
It is submitted here that no other result could rationally have
been reached by the Emery court. Accepting the Supreme Court,
federal, and state tests of the investment contract concept, it becomes
apparent that the customer referral agreement did not fall within
the criteria established by the tests of Joiner, Howey, and other
cases. Nor did it fall within Ohio judicial holdings. Clearly, the
only profit to be derived from the referral agreement would be that
obtained exclusively by the efforts of the purchaser in seeking
80 Ibid.
81 199 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Ohio App. 1964).
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 id. at 125.
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"qualified prospects" or persons willing to consummate a contract
of sale with the defendant for its product. Unlike the situations in
Joiner and Howey, no effort, service, or operation by the defendant
corporation was essential to the realization of profit, and the pur-
chaser was not relying exclusively - or to any degree - on the
efforts, skill, or management by the defendant.
Although the purpose of the Ohio Securities Act, like other state
blue sky laws, is - at least in part - the prevention of the perpetra-
tion of fraud or misrepresentation, and although the entire transaction
in the Emery case appeared tainted with fraud or with some degree of
deceit, it must be remembered that the Ohio Act is designed to encom-
pass the field of securities alone. And, while the definition of security
in Ohio is extremely broad, it does have definite limits. Were the court
to have avoided the agreement in the Emery case as a "security" not
registered or licensed for sale, it would necessarily have forced it-
self into the position of avoiding many other routine business con-
tracts on that basis. Surely the Securities Act was not designed to
be a general statute to protect against fraud. It was geared to a
specialized area. If the plaintiffs in the Emery case had any remedy
- and the court implied that perhaps they did not 5 - then that
remedy should have been sought in a statute concerned with rescis-
sion for fraud of an ordinary contract.
B. Other Jurisdictions
Finally, it is important to look briefly at several cases which
arose in Illinois and California, two states in which a relatively
large amount of litigation has occurred in this field.
In Hammer v. Sanders,"8 the defendants were partners in an oil
drilling firm and sold fractional interests in their oil leases to the
purchasers. The sales were consummated by means of "letter agree-
ments," according to which the purchasers were assigned an undi-
vided working interest in the oil and gas leases for a specific sum,
and the defendants agreed to commence drilling a well, with pur-
chasers to pay a proportionate part of the monthly operating ex-
pense in the event of a producing well. Claiming that this transac-
tion constituted a security under the Illinois Securities Act of 1919,7
the purchaser sought to rescind the sale and recover the considera-
85 Ibid.
868 Ill. 2d 414, 134 N.E.2d 509, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).
87 ILL. SECURITIBs LAW OF 1919, IIl. Laws 351 (now ILL. SEcu~rriEs LAW OF
1953 §5 137.1-.19).
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tion paid. The trial court found the interests to constitute secur-
ities, but the court of appeals and the supreme court reversed. The
Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that the real purpose of the letter
agreements was apportionment of capital for development between
the parties as co-owners, and that the transfer of the working in-
terest to the plaintiffs was only individual and subsidiary to this
essential purpose.
In a more recent Illinois case, Polikoff v. Levy,"8 plaintiff
entered into an agreement with defendants to buy shares of units
in a motel being built by defendants. Plaintiff invested a certain
amount of money in the venture and claimed that the sale of units
was the avoidable sale of unregistered securities. The defendant
contended that plaintiff entered into a joint venture with the de-
fendant and others to construct a motel and conduct a motel busi-
ness, which is not within the purview of the securities laws. The
court, looking to the substance of the transaction and the relation
between the parties, stated that these elements control over the form
of the instrument, as stressed in the Joiner and Howey cases.
Emphasizing that the Illinois and federal courts have defined invest-
ment contract and security as dependent on profits arising solely
from the efforts of others, the court pointed out the rationale behind
excluding transactions on which the profits do not come solely from
the efforts of others:
In such situations, the member of the enterprise pools his mon-
ey with that of others in the group; he has an equal right of con-
trol over the project and the opportunity and right to know what
is going on. Because of this, the protection of the full disclosure
offered by registration is not needed as it is in cases involving a
non-participating investor.89
In the instant case, there was a joint venture to buy and improve
real estate - i.e., an association of persons engaged in an enter-
prise for profit, with a community of interest in purpose and an
expectation of profit and the sharing of the profit. Since the court
found a true joint venture here, the transaction did not fall within
the provisions of the securities acts."
California has broadly interpreted its definition of security,
which also includes investment contracts. 1 Traditionally, Califor-
88 55 Ii. App. 2d 229, 254 N.E.2d 807 (1965).
89 Id. at 231, 254 N.E.2d at 809.
90 Ibid.
9 1 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008.
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nia courts have tended to construe the term liberally and have ad-
hered to the concepts espoused in the Supreme Court cases. In
Moore v. Stella,92 a California appellate court stressed the neces-
sity of disregarding mere form for substance. Thus, in that case
it examined certain transactions to determine whether they were
true transfers of interest in real estate to be held or sold by the
grantees without participation with others in a profit-sharing ven-
ture, or whether, though they were actually conveyances of definite
interests in real property, they were also intended to transfer
rights to participate in earnings or profits. It pointed out that this
was a question of fact to be determined by the trial court. The
appellate court stated that the state's policy demanded that all
schemes be subject to regulation for investment, in spite of any pro-
cedures employed which are designed to make profits depend on the
management and control of others."8
III. CONCLUSION
A careful examination of the investment contract aspect of
securities reveals, in general, a trend toward expansion of that con-
cept. It has been held by state and federal courts to indude in-
struments and transactions which cannot readily be classified ac-
cording to any other definition of security. The primary test in
determining whether a particular transaction constitutes such an in-
vestment contract is whether the profit to be derived from an enter-
prise depends solely on the efforts of the promotei-vendor or on
the efforts of others than the investor. While this test has been
broadly construed so as to apply to questionable fact situations, in
Ohio, at least, it has not been construed so as to bring all transac-
tions within its purview. The customer referral agreement situa-
tion exemplifies this fact.
LESLIE J. CROCKER
92 127 P.2d 300 (Cal. App. 1942).
93 Id. at 306.
1966] 1125
